Section III: Evidence-Based Antitrust for the Digital Economy: Policies and Proposals

ABSTRACT

Section III analyzes contemporary proposals to overhaul the antitrust laws and offers evidence-based proposals for how to improve antitrust institutions to promote competition in the digital economy.

Does Big Tech Need Its Own Regulator?

In this chapter we explain that creating a new agency has potential benefits and risks. The typical anticipated benefit of creating a new agency is specialized expertise. An expert agency holds a comparative advantage over general...

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Essential Facilities Doctrine: Access Regulation Disguised as Antitrust Enforcement

This chapter describes the emergence of the EFD and reviews its development against the background of major trends in the continuing evolution of federal antitrust law. It then analyzes recent Supreme Court cases that have questioned and...

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Standard Development Organizations, Intellectual Property, and Standardization: Fundamentals and Recent Proposals

This chapter begins with a primer on SDOs in Section I, followed by a review of the competition policy debate on SDOs and intellectual property rights in Section II. In Section III, I summarize some of the recent proposals that relate to...

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Competition, Regulation, and 5G

The first part of this chapter puts forward a brief background on technology. The second part examines the use of 5G in FCC and DOJ merger review. The third part analyzes the potential increased efficiency and decentralization of the...

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Antitrust and Ex-Ante Sector Regulation

Using ex-ante regulation to replace inefficient and ineffective ex-post litigation based antitrust is a familiar refrain for those interested in regulating large technology firms. But the narrative that antitrust is either solely or...

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Evaluating the Case for Regulation of Digital Platforms

The aim of this chapter is to analyze recently released reports and policy papers to evaluate whether regulatory interventions reflect the distinctive features of digital markets and their leading players or whether the main thrust of...

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Algorithmic Collusion and Algorithmic Compliance: Risks and Opportunities

Algorithms are becoming ubiquitous in our society. They are powerful and, in some cases, indispensable tools in today’s economy. In terms of the technology, we do not yet have AI sophisticated enough to, with a reasonable degree of...

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Digital Duty to Deal, Data Portability, and Interoperability

In this chapter, we discuss the development of the duty to deal doctrine in antitrust law, its application to the digital economy, and proposals for specific duties to deal, such as data portability and interoperability. Part I outlines...

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Section 230: An Introduction for Antitrust & Consumer Protection Practitioners

This chapter focuses on complaints about “content moderation” because ICS providers are far more likely to be subject to unfair competition and consumer protection claims (meritorious or otherwise) for choosing not to carry, or...

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Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities in the Digital Economy

Exemptions and immunities limit the reach of the antitrust laws. If the courts and agencies implement exemptions and immunities too expansively, anticompetitive conduct will elude enforcement and thereby injure consumers. The dynamic...

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Occupational Licensing in Digital Markets

This chapter proceeds as follows. Section I begins with the background and recent history of the state action doctrine and its relation to occupational licensure, addressing the recent cases listed above. Section II discusses recent and...

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Antitrust and Privacy

This Chapter discusses the theories behind the call to incorporate privacy into antitrust and identifies some potential legal and economic hurdles to their application. Chief among them are (1) the extent to which privacy is an important...

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Institutional Reforms and Agency Design

Despite the idiosyncratic and sometimes counterproductive institutional scheme of federal antitrust enforcement created by failed Congressional design and decades of iterative experimentation, the U.S. antitrust agencies function...

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The Economics of Digital Platforms: A Guide for Regulators

This chapter examines the economics of digital platforms and two-sided markets and discusses the economic conditions that underlie policy assertions by advocates of both interventionist and laissez-faire policies. We include applications...

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What Brooke Group Joined Let None Put Asunder: The Need for the Price-Cost and Recoupment Prongs in Analyzing Digital Predation

This chapter proceeds in five parts. The first provides a brief history of the law and economics of predatory pricing doctrine in the United States, and how a revolution in economic and legal thinking spurred by Areeda and Turner’s...

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